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In light of the development of Cash Transfer Programs and scientific evidence that place such               
assistance programs as an option to aid people in situations of vulnerability, guaranteeing             
them social benefits, this article aims to conduct a comparative analysis between the Cash              
Based Interventions - Program developed by the United Nations High Commissioner for            
Refugees (UNHCR); and Bolsa Família - Brazilian Federal Government Program, in order to             
understand and clarify the points of convergence and divergence of these two examples of              
Cash Transfer Programs. Understanding the scope of action of each of these programs, this              
research outlines their objectives, financing and implementation mechanism and, finally, the           
risks and outcomes of both programs. By drawing a comparison between these delimited             
points, this article seeks to understand how the points of convergence between the two              
initiatives result in the development of common areas - such as education, health, quality of               
life and others - of their beneficiaries, while explaining how the main divergences between the               
forms of conception and performance of these two programs they are responsible for             
determining discrepancies in the results obtained by them and mainly in the consolidation of              
their distinct performance indicators, reflecting their specificities. 
 
 





À luz do desenvolvimento de Programas de Transferência de Renda e de evidências             
científicas que colocam tal ação assistencialista como uma forma de auxílio a pessoas em              
situações de vulnerabilidade que traz maiores benefícios sociais, o presente trabalho tem            
como objetivo fazer uma análise comparativa entre o Cash-Based Intervention - Programa            
desenvolvido pelo Alto Comissariado das Nações Unidas para os Refugiados (ACNUR); e o             
Bolsa Família - Programa do Governo Federal brasileiro, a fim de entender e elucidar os               
pontos de convergência e divergência desses dois exemplos de transferência de renda.            
Entendendo o escopo de atuação de cada um desses programas, essa pesquisa delimita os              
objetivos de cada um deles, sua forma de financiamento e implementação, e por fim, os riscos                
e resultados de ambos os programas. Traçando um comparativo entre esses pontos            
delimitados, busca-se entender como os pontos de convergência entre as duas iniciativas            
resultam em desenvolvimentos de áreas comuns - como educação, saúde, qualidade de vida,             
dentre outras - de seus beneficiários, ao mesmo tempo que explicita como as divergências              
principais entre as formas de concepção e atuação desses dois programas são responsáveis por              
determinar discrepâncias nos resultados obtidos por eles e principalmente na consolidação de            
seus indicadores de desempenho distintos, reflexo de suas especificidades. 
 
 





For several years, man-made and natural disasters have put people at risk, a reality that               
was worsened by the common scenario in developing countries where a large part of their               
population suffer from social inequality and income concentration. Traditionally, the most           
common form of aid that would meet certain immediate needs of vulnerable population, is              
donation in-kind goods such as food and medicine, but not always is this form of aid viable or                  
sustainable. States with a high percentage of people living under the poverty line must find               
sustainable alternatives to ensure a basic quality of life, assuring services such as: education,              
health, food, housing, transportation, basic sanitation, energy supply, paid work and leisure.            
As a strategy for these issues, countries often adopt an assistencial national program, and in               
cases where countries face political or economic instability - due to international constraints             
or internal dispute-, their relief is often obtained from external sources. 
In the past, humanitarian organizations - such as the World Food Programme (WFP),             
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), International Federation of Red           
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the United Nations High Commissioner for             
Refugees (UNHCR) - have traditionally supported crisis-affected populations by donating          
goods or services, such as: food, shelter, water, tents, clothing and medical help (CENTER              
FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p.7). Even though these in-kind physical donations           
meet a certain demand, “changes in technology, growing access to financial services, greater             
urbanisation, and the emergence of government social safety nets are all creating            
unprecedented opportunities for humanitarian support to reach people in new ways”           
(CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 2015, P.7). 
Non-governmental organizations and state leaders have invested in new measures to           
aid vulnerable populations. Developing countries often turn to social programs, such as            
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program (​Programa Bolsa Família​) (PBF), and Mexico’s          
Opportunities (​Oportunidades​) Program through which the government allocates a certain          
amount of money to poor and extremely poor families “aiming to alleviate the poverty              
implications, improve living conditions, health and education of this population” (MORAES           
et al​, 2018, p.365), often implying certain behavioral conditionalities. As for the NGOs, they              
take on the State's’ responsibility to provide main services in cases where the host government               
is unable to fulfill its traditional role (ULLEBERG, 2009, p.8). An example of such              
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Cash-Based interventions, is when in 2006, the UNHCR intervened in Jordan in 2016,             
“providing US$85 million in cash assistance to over 136,000 Syrian refugees in the country”              
(UNHCR, 2017, p. iv) - in this case the job opportunities available to the refugees was                
“concentrated in the informal economy and faced precarious immediate livelihood conditions           
coupled with risks of exploitation without adequate social protection nets” (UNHCR, 2017, p.             
9-10).  
In both these scenarios, monetary aid presents itself as a more interesting approach to              
reach a bigger number of people, according to the Center for Global Development: 
 
Cash transfers are among the most well-researched and rigorously-evaluated         
humanitarian tools of the last decade. The Panel identified more than 200            
resources and studies, including randomised control trials, which evaluate         
the effectiveness of cash transfers. These provide evidence about the          
feasibility, cost and effectiveness of cash transfers in humanitarian settings,          
and are complemented by extensive evidence on cash transfers for poverty           
reduction. [...] This evidence is compelling: in most contexts, humanitarian          
cash transfers can be provided to people safely, efficiently and          
accountability. (CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p.8) 
 
Cash Transfer is commonly perceived as an adaptation to traditional humanitarian aid - where              
organizations distribute in-kind goods -, with cash distribution, vulnerable populations          
“receive an envelope of cash, a plastic card or an electronic money transfer to a mobile phone,                 
with which they can buy food, pay rent and purchase what they need locally” (CENTER FOR                
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p.7). In receiving the money directly, they are able to             
attend to their own personals needs while benefiting the local economy - studies show that the                
distributed money is often spend in local markets and suppliers (CENTER FOR GLOBAL             
DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p.7), and because of this, many organizations defend this form of             
aid as a “highly effective way to reduce suffering faster and make limited humanitarian aid               
budgets go further” (CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p. 7). 
Cash Transfer Programs can take many shapes, they can be goal oriented, such as              
Bolsa Familia, inspecting the progress of certain indicators to determine if the beneficiaries             
are no longer living under extreme poverty, or they can also base their actions in identifying                
the vulnerable, allowing them to determine their own priorities, financing the tools needed for              
them to address and meet their own needs. A more applied form of Cash Transfer Programs is                 
a conditional transfer, where there are pre-established requirements that must be fulfilled in             
order to receive the benefits. To ensure that the given amount is spent as efficiently as                
possible - these restrictions may stipulate specific requirements for participation in the            
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program, up to how the money should be spent. 
According to the Center for Development (2015, p. 8), “Cash transfers are among the              
most well-researched and rigorously-evaluated humanitarian tools of the last decade […] in            
most contexts, humanitarian cash transfers can be provided to people safely, efficiently and             
accountability”. Two examples of Cash Transfer Programs developed by a State and by an              
International Organization are: the UNHCR’s Cash-Based Interventions (CBI), and the          
Brazilian social policy Bolsa Familia Program (PBF).  
The UNHCR’s operates worldwide interventions that empower refugees to meet their           
own needs, increasing dignity, choice, and protection, both during displacement and upon            
return (UNHCR DPSM, p. 1). This protection is intended to create a strategy that expects to                
tackle specific risks, “enabling refugees to meet their priority needs through flexible and             
appropriate assistance, so that harmful coping strategies, such as survival sex, child labour,             
family separation and forced marriage, can be avoided” (UNHCR DPSM, p. 2).  
While Brazil’s Bolsa Familia exists as a national strategy “to combating extreme            
poverty, hunger and social inequality” (BRAZIL, 2004) by reinforcing an educational criteria,            
conditioning that the beneficiary’s offspring attend school and maintain a minimum school            
attendance rate (SANTOS ​et al​, 2019), the families supposed to be able to achieve positive               
results on educational indicators, “such as the increase in school enrollment, the decrease             
dropout rate and repetition rate” (MORAES, 2018, p. 365). In establishing behavioral            
requirements in the areas of ​​health and education, the Brazilian government aims to reinforce              
that the beneficiaries comply with the recommendations of the Ministry of Health - such as               
maintain up to date vaccination and regular medical consultation - ensuring that the             
beneficiary's physical and mental health is taken care of, while the educational conditionalities             
aim to reinforce the importance of education to “help break the intergenerational cycle of              
poverty” (MORAES, 2018, p. 368). 
Even though both programs provide aid to vulnerable individuals to abet their need for              
basics demands, such as shelter, food and education, it is interesting to observe how the               
applicability criteria and the conditionalities of the two examples differ. In this sense, this              
article aims to analyze what are the structural diverging and converging points of the two               
programs - UNHCR’s Cash-Based Interventions (CBI) and Bolsa Familia. With more           
information on the framework of each Cash Transfer Program, it will be possible to question               
if these specific points are relevant to determine the achieved results, and whether the              
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convergences and divergences between each program play an important role in differentiating            
their outcomes and main structural aspects. 
Based on this research question, the main hypothesis is that the identified converging             
points between both programs produced benefits and development in the same areas of the              
societies where they are implemented - such as health or wellness - as well as, the diverging                 
points should be responsible for justifying major discrepancies between both programs, such            
as the difference in conditionalities, reach different impacts.  
To compare the objectives and final results of the two Cash Transfer Programs, this              
article first identifies what are their general differences and similarities, also looking at the              
principles that guide each programs, and how they manage their operations and set their              
objectives. Then, by pinpointing the conditionalities and eligibility criteria for each program,            
it is possible to better understand the reality of the targeted beneficiaries. Finally evaluating              
the administrative structure, risks and overall outcomes of each program.  
It is worth mentioning that this work is intrinsically a comparative case study. In              
analyzing the scopes and guidelines of the two programs - that have a similar theoretical               
backbone -, the objective is to identify divergences and convergences, and thus to analyze              
their results. Therefore, this article does not intend to frame these programs in an exhaustive               
theoretical analysis on Cash Transfer Programs, or even outline new causal relations of             
success or failure to be replicated in different programs, limiting the deepness of this article to                




2. Origin and Principles of the Programs 
Income transfer policies can play a relevant role in improving the quality of life of               
populations living under extreme situations by offering them resources to suffice their basic             
needs themselves, therefore discontinuing negative behavior patterns caused by the lack of            
food security and shelter. Understanding the origin and objectives of assistencialist programs            
is fundamental to distinguish their qualification to intervene as well as, comprehend their             
influence on the livelihood of the population they assist.  
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To better grasp the principles and foundations of each program, this chapter is divided              
into three sub-chapters that outline the motives and objectives of each program. Considering             
the influence of the founding objectives, the relevance of financial resources - that enable              
such assistance -, and the particularities of the implementation process, there will be a specific               
sub-chapter dedicated to each of these issues. The first will identify the pre-established             
objectives of each program. The second sub-chapter will be focus on the financial resources              
that support the implementation of each of the programs. Lastly, the third sub-chapter will              
describe how the implementation of each programs takes place.  
 
2.1 Foundation and Objectives 
 
UNHCR’s Cash-Based Interventions became one of the principal modalities for          
delivering assistance and providing refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, internally displaced         
and stateless people, with an opportunity to have dignity of choice in meeting their needs - by                 
engaging directly with the concerned population, and employing multipurpose grants to           
support multi-sectoral needs (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3).  
 
Cash-based interventions can be stand-alone interventions or they can         
be used in combination with in-kind assistance (e.g. a cash grant to            
top-up a partial food aid ration; milling voucher with food ration;           
seeds with a cash grant for tools; shelter materials with a cash            
component for labour). (UNHCR, 2012, p. 6). 
 
To ensure that an Intervention has the best chance to succeed, UNHCR familiarizes             
with the host country political and economic climate, studying the active social policies - in               
views of “taking advantage of pertinent national developments systems” (UNHCR, 2016, p.            
3). Following, the implementation phase is based on a “Basic Needs Approach”, which is a               
perspective adopted to “enable refugees to meet their basic needs and achieve longer-term             
well-being through means to survive” (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3). In other words, the agency acts               
in  areas where the population needs more assistance.  
Since the mid-1980s, the UNHCR has been a pioneer in employing Cash-Based            
Interventions, and currently “over 60 countries ranging from operations with large-scale           
multi-purpose grants to programs limited in scope or scale” (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3). The              
success of the implementation of these programs depend on many factors: on the involvement              
7 
of the host government - in actively engaging with the agency to precisely asses the unmet                
needs and accurately defining the targeted audience, on the accuracy of the multi-sector             
approach, on the protection risks plan, as well as the overall outcomes (UNHCR (Basic Needs               
Approach), p. 3). 
An example of a cash transfer program at a domestic perspective is Brazil’s Bolsa              
Familia Program (PBF) that emerged as a “local initiative geared towards combating poverty,             
eliminating child labor and increasing the schooling of children and adolescents” (​WWP, 2017,             
p. 2)​. Bolsa Família was created in 2003 (by Law No. 10,836/2004) as an initiative from the                 
Federal Government to unify the management and execution of smaller preexisting social            
cash transfer programs - ​Bolsa Escola (“School Grant”), ​Cartão Alimentação (“Food Card”),            
Bolsa Alimentação (“Food Grant”), ​Auxílio-Gás (“Cooking Gas Voucher”) - establishing a           1
Unified Registry platform that centralizes the registration and selection of beneficiaries for the             
program (WWP, 2017, p. 2). Basing itself on the guidelines of the Constitution, 
 
the PBF was structured based on the following principles: a)          
Combating poverty and social inequality as a shared responsibility of          
all federated entities; b) Non-contributory social protection, which is         
the set of public strategies to ensure fulfillment of the social rights            
provided for in the Federal Constitution, guaranteeing every Brazilian         
citizen free access to services, programs, projects and benefits,         
regardless of any contribution or direct payment made to social          
security or social insurance; c) Social protection of the family, with           
the State supporting the family’s ability to care for and assist its            
members, considering their different needs and forms of organization;         
d) An intersectoral nature, which takes place in the coordination          
between the areas responsible for ensuring some of the social rights of            
Brazilian citizens: education, healthcare and social assistance; e)        
Decentralized management, which is one of the guiding principles of          
Brazilian public policy. This principle enables the Federal        
Government, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities to          
act in a co-responsible and cooperative manner in the implementation          
of the PBF and the Unified Registry; and f) Social inclusion, which            
allows for the socially excluded to share social goods and services           
produced by society. (WWP, 2017, p. 2) 
 
Even though other Cash Transfer Programs were already in place, the main objective             
of Bolsa Família was to “expand the assistance coverage of the population most vulnerable to               
food insecurity, in addition to regularizing social benefits” (SEGALL-CORREA, 2008, p. 41).            
Bolsa Família currently provides different benefits for families who are classified as poor and              
1 Source: WWW, 2017, p. 2 
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extremely poor. PBF takes into consideration the value of the family’s collective income             
divided per family member, and family composition - extending supplementary benefits to            
family with children, teenagers, pregnant women, or nursing mothers (BRAZIL, 2004).           
Overall, in views of “overcoming the reproductive cycle of poverty in Brazilian families”             
(WWP, 2017, p.1), the PBF operates in three dimensions: 
 
1st: Promote immediate poverty relief through direct cash transfers to          
families; 2nd: Strengthen the exercise of basic social rights in the           
areas of healthcare, education and social assistance, through the         
fulfillment of conditionalities, which helps families overcome the        
intergenerational poverty cycle; 3rd. Promote opportunities for the        
development of families, through actions that promote the        
overcoming of vulnerability and poverty by PBF beneficiaries.        
(WWP, 2017, p. 1) 
 
The intergenerational approach of PBF is one of its most particular characteristics.            
Since its conception, there is no end date to the Program (WWP, 2017, p. 2), constitutionality                
consolidating the national commitment to distribute direct cash to - eligible - beneficiaries,             
without intermediations of any kind, not only does it “promptly assists families in a situation               
of vulnerability and poverty” (WWP, 2017, p. 2), but the fulfillment of the conditionalities by               
the beneficiaries, complies with the government's agenda to increase their involvement in            
health practices, as well as, guarantee that they the available opportunities to educate             
themselves. Not only does this initiative reinforces basic rights, but it is a solid strategy to                
break the intergenerational poverty cycle (​idem​). 
 
 
2.2 Financial Resources 
 
Even though most agencies of the United Nations (UN) receive an annual budget to              
finance its activities, UNHCR is one of the few UN agencies which depends almost entirely               
on voluntary contributions to fund their operations (UNHCR, 2001, p. 16). The overall budget              
is made up of: 
 
eighty six per cent of - voluntary contributions - from governments           
and the European Union, three per cent comes from other          
intergovernmental organizations and pooled funding mechanisms,      
while a further ten per cent is from the private sector, including            
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foundations, corporations and the public. Additionally, we receive a         
limited subsidy (one per cent) from the UN budget for administrative           
costs, and accept in-kind contributions, including items such as tents,          
medicines and trucks. (UNHCR ) 
2
 
About only two percent of UNHCR’s annual budget is covered by a subsidy from the               
UN regular budget. These funds are mainly used to ​subsidize about 200 administrative posts              
at Headquarters. (UNHCR, 2001, p. 16). 
 
Table 1. Budget and Expenditure of the UNHCR (2016-2020) 
Year Budget Amount (U$) Expenditure Amount (U$) 
2016 U$ 7,092,015,471 U$ 3,960,477,685 
2017 U$ 7,439,961,056 U$ 4,075,677,854 
2018 U$ 7,730,785,009 U$ 4,218,165,441 
2019 U$ 8,158,941,740 N/A 
2020 U$ 8,102,975,204 N/A 
          Source: Own production, data from: UNHCR: Global Focus  3
 
It is worth noting that the above figures of the total budget of the UNHCR is the                 
amount of financial resources of the four pillars of the organization: Refugee Programme,             
Stateless Programme, Reintegration Projects, IDP Projects (UNHCR - Global Focus). With           
this in mind, not necessarily all of the amount allocated to the UNHCR is spent on cash                 
distribution programs - such as the CBI. As for the difference of budget and expenditure               
amounts, the own subjective criteria of the CBI - that is case based and susceptible to                
demand-, justifies why the expenditures vary from year to year.  
As for the budget allocation for each project, as a first step, field agents are sent to                 
locally identify - and prioritize - the basic needs of the vulnerable population they are trying to                 
support. During this visit, UNHCR staff liaises with the host government on what are the               
preexisting social projects already in place, and how they can act in parallel with these               
2 Source: UNHCR - Figures at a Glance, available from: 
<https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>, access on: 9 May 2020. 
3 Available from: 
<​http://reporting.unhcr.org/financial#_ga=2.195163748.915667496.1588907255-987971757.15549450
19​>, access on: 9 May 2020. 
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programs in order to achieve better results. After the data on the local community is compiled,                
the UNHCR shares these informations with UN Agencies, NGOs and other partners to seek              
financial support, joining efforts to create a response program with a sustainable and realistic              
budget (UNHCR, 2004, p. 17). Even though the UNHCR is partly financed by the UN, the                
main budget of CBIs comes from international donations from countries and partnering            
organizations. In reference to the amount designated to each intervention, 
the size of the transfer depends mainly on the objectives and the            
prevailing market conditions. If, for example, the cash-based        
intervention aims to cover the food needs of the beneficiary          
household, the value of the transfer will be set based on a theoretical,             
nutritionally balanced and culturally acceptable food basket which is         
costed at the local market or the most likely place where the refugees             
shop as prices vary geographically. (UNHCR, 2012, p. 9) 
 
As for the Bolsa Familia Program, the annual budget is stipulated by the Brazilian              
Annual Budget Law, proposed yearly by the Executive branch - who exercises control over              
government finances -, and approved by the National Congress (FEDERAL DISTRICT). The            
Annual Budget Law “indicates how much and where to spend federal public money over a               
period of one year, based on the total amount collected by taxes” (CHAMBER OF              
DEPUTIES). 
It is worth mentioning that, even if the budget allocated to PBF is predefined in the                
previous year, there is still room for political maneuvers that can modify this amount. In 2019,                
to fulfill a pledge made during the election period, President Bolsonaro demanded that the              
Minister of Citizenship - currently responsible for accepting new candidatures - interrupted            
the registration of new entries, and denied to update the benefit amount with the inflation rate,                
strategy chosen to save expenses and spare the designated budget (ZYLBERKAN, 2020). In             
this sense, the initial budget was stretched and managed to fulfill a political promise,              
prioritizing the guarantee of an electoral strategy over the insertion of new Brazilians in the               
list of people benefited by the program. 
On the contrary, in cases where the Executive branch deems necessary to increase the              
expenditures above the limit stipulated by law, this decision is submitted to approval by the               
Congress. The same applies for cases in which the government wants to issue an expenditure               
restraint - which may derive from collective or presidential initiative - there are resources that               
safeguards and regulates this right. By means of Contingency Decrees, it is legally possible to               
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limit public spending and spend less than what was allocated - and guaranteed - by the Annual                 
Budget Law, provided that it also obtains the approval of Congress (CHAMBER OF             
DEPUTIES). That is, as much as the annual budget for the Bolsa Família Program is               
stipulated at the beginning of the Fiscal Year, this amount is not set in stone, there are still                  
tools that can decrease or increase - in cases of public calamity - the PBF budget. 
 
Table 2. Budget of Bolsa Família Program by year (2016-2020)  4
Year Amount (R$) Amount (U$)  5
2016 R$ 33,570,000,000 U$ 9,620,000,000 
2017 R$ 31,805,000,000 U$ 9,970,000,000 
2018 R$ 32,500,000,000 U$ 8,904,000,000 
2019 R$ 34,570,000,000 U$ 8,750,000,000 
2020 R$ 29,500,000,000 U$ 6,400,000,000 
  ​Source: Own production. Data from: Comptroller General of the Union, 2020.  6
 
Above are the yearly approved budget of Bolsa Familia and from the figures it is               
possible to conclude that the PBF has a larger budget - up to 20 times the budget of UNHCR                   
per year - and.that was the amount designated to the program has been on an increasing streak                 
since 2016, but recently started to decrease - this change could be linked to the 2019                
presidential elections and the beginning of a new executive mandate. It is also worth noting               
that the increase in Bolsa Familia budget does not necessarily indicates an increase in the               
amount of the per capita benefit, since the increase in the budget can be accompanied by a                 
bigger increase in the number of beneficiaries of the program (KYLBERKAN, 2020).  
 
 
4 the values ​​were corrected based on the inflation reported by the Central Bank, based on the IPCA 
index (IBGE), available from: 
<https://www3.bcb.gov.br/CALCIDADAO/publico/exibirFormCorrecaoValores.do?method=exibirFormC
orrecaoValores&aba=1>, access on: 14 May 2020. 
5 For comparison purposes, the applied average conversion rate per year was based on IPEA data 
(http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ExibeSerie.aspx?serid=31924): 2016 - R$3.49/U$, 2017 - R$3.19/U$, 
2018 - R$3.65/U$, 2019 - R$3.95, 2020 - R$4.61/U$. 
6 Source available from: 
<http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/programas-e-acoes/programa-orcamentario/2019?ano=2019>, 
access on: 9 May 2020. 
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2.3 Management and Implementation 
 
Since the UNHCR operates in different countries, its implementation starts well before            
the actual distribution of the monetary benefits. CBI follow an “end-to-end solution” strategy             
made up of the following steps: 1) Identify Management: registering refugees and capturing             
data for initial vulnerability modeling; 2) Needs Assessment & Response Analysis: involve            
the refugees in joint assessment with partners, collect multi-sectoral data on household level             
of income and expenditures, select transfer modality based on cost efficiency and            
effectiveness, and issue a join response analysis that takes into consideration the existing             
mechanism, political feasibility and market capacity; 3) Implementation: referrer refugees to           
national systems; 4) Monitoring & Evaluation: establish a two-way communication approach           
with the refugees, to receive information on complaint and appeals, and monitor the             
performance and impacts to ensure social inclusion and to detect negative coping mechanism.             
(UNHCR (Basic Need Approach)). Model shown in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1 - UNHCR’s model for providing cash assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan              
(2016) 
Source: GIORDANO ​et al, apud UNHCR Cash Assistance: UNHCR cash assistance: Improving refugee lives              
and supporting local economies, UNHCR 
 
Differently from the UNHCR, the main stakeholders of Bolsa Familia is the Brazilian             
government and its population, relying solely on the Federal Government for management            
and financing, while the states, the Federal District and the municipalities share the             
responsibility of implementing the actual policies (WWP, 2017, p. 2). The execution and             
management of the Bolsa Família Program takes place in a decentralized manner, through the              
combination of efforts between the federated entities to intersectionality manage the           
participations while maintaining social control (Brazil, 2004, article 8). It is worth noting that,              
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since Brazil is a federation, the participation of states and municipalities is based on voluntary               
membership. (Brazil, 2004, article 8 paragraph 1). 
Distribution wise, the Federal government’s competency to Identify Management, by          
developing standardized management instruments and procedures, proving financial support         
to the states, municipalities and the Federal District for the performance of their regional              
duties (WWP, 2017, p. 2). It is also the Federal government's responsibility to guarantee a               
Needs Assessment and Response Analysis, by implementing the payment of the monthly            
benefits, supporting the training of the staff involved in the management and implementation             
of the Program, and creating communication channels to receive suggestions and complaints            
on irregularities (WWP, 2017, p. 2). 
The third and fourth scopes of the PBF - Implementation and Monitoring and             
Evaluation - are competencies of the States and Municipalities governments (WWP, 2017, p.             
2). To guarantee the implementation of the program, the state governments coordinate state             
departments of social assistance, education, health and labor to administer the funds as well              
as, monitor the compliance with the established conditionalities. As for the Evaluation, the             
local municipalities are responsible for updating the figures of participants, monitor the            
benefits and oversight the PBF initiatives in the community, creating complementary actions            
if needed (WWP, 2017, p.2) 
Because the transfer is made digitally, it is easier to have an accountability for the               
distributed value and the number of people benefited, increasing the transparency of the             
amount spent - it can be especially important in the case of transparency of public budgets for                 
countries and transparency of the distribution of donations, in the case of UNHCR. Both              
programs also apply compulsory conditionalities to guarantee the maximum benefit of the            
resource. 
Overall, the CBI and PBF issue a data collection for vulnerability modeling. In PBF’s              
case, since the program is a unification of previous social programs already in place, it is                
especially more interesting to keep track on who was already registered in other social              
programs, to guarantee their inclusion in the new Unified Registry Platform. Considering that             
both programs rely on a previous known budget to accept new applications and projects, both               
depend on multi-sectoral data do understand the household income and what are the unmet              
needs of goods and services. Both programs also issue a join response by exploring different               
social programs available - in CBI the host government is often engaged with the UNHCR, to                
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share other assistance projects already in place -, making sure that vulnerable people are              
supported by all available policies.  
It is interest to highlight that most UNHCR interventions are often implemented to             
facilitate the return and reintegration of refugees (UNHCR, 2011, p. 108). CBIs are one of the                
strategies “part of a broader package of assistance for voluntary repatriation that includes             
basic domestic items, food, and shelter materials”. In this sense, the duration of the two               
programs is one of the biggest discrepancies between them considering that the PBF - since its                
origin - has no end date (BRAZIL, 2004). 
 
3. Conditionalities and Obligations 
 
By defining an applicability criterium, assistentialist programs can target the most           
vulnerable population, benefiting people that ar more in need of the immediate support.             
Another strategy that is used to complement and improve the reach of the programs to other                
areas - other than increasing their purchasing power - is to impose behavioral requirements              
that encourage investments in human capital in areas of health and education - such as enforce                
school attendance, immunizations and health check-ups (WORLD BANK, 2015). 
To evaluate the eligibility criteria of each program as well as, the conditionalities             
applied in each case, this chapter introduces the prerequisites necessary to participate in each              
of the programs, defining the specific points that are taken into consideration when granting              
the benefits. Also, this section will define the behavioral requirements - of the beneficiary - of                
the UNHCR’s CBI and Brazil’s Bolsa Família. 
 
3.1 Eligibility Criteria 
 
The UNHCR’s CBI bases its the selection criteria by determining the profile of             
vulnerability of a specific community. UNHCR adopts a evidence-based “Vulnerability          
Assessment Framework” (GIORDANO ​et al​, 2017, p. 14) where the principals taken into             
consideration to access this vulnerability are: Shelter, Wash, Predicted welfare,          
Documentation status, Coping strategies, Dependency ratio, Basic Needs, Education, Food          
and Health (​idem​). 
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Bolsa Familia applies simpler criterium, basing the selection on the monthly per capita             
family income and family composition (BRAZIL, 2004). The two categories of beneficiaries            
that can participate in the program are: the extremely poor families that have a monthly               
income of up to R$89.00 per person, and the poor families that have a monthly income                
between R$89.01 and R$178.00 per person and that has a pregnant women and children or               
adolescents between 0 and 17 years old in the family (CAIXA ECONOMICA FEDERAL). 
The approvals are granted by the Ministry of Citizenship (former Ministry of Social             
Development), and the selections are made from the applications uploaded to the Unified             
Registry system (​"Cadastro Único"​) - data entered by city halls in the Federal Government's              
Single Registry of Social Programs. The selection is done monthly, and the criterias used are               
the family composition and the income of each member. (CAIXA ECONOMICA FEDERAL) 
 
3.2 Behavioral Requirements  
 
According to the World Bank Group (WBG) (2015): “the impacts on reducing the             
poverty gap depend on how well the poor are covered and on the adequacy of benefits”. In a                  
study carried out by the WBG (2015), they defined these protection measures applied in              
conjunction with the benefits as being called “Social Safety Nets” (WORLD BANK, 2015),             
one of the six types of safety net that apply in both programs analyzed in this research is                  
“Conditional Cash Transfers” (CCTs), which are: 
periodic monetary benefits to poor households that require        
beneficiaries to comply with specific behavioral requirements to        
encourage investments in human capital (such as school attendance,         
immunizations, and health checkups). The report includes under the         
category of CCTs any cash transfer program that has a conditionality           
component in its operation manual, even if it is weakly conditioned or            
weakly enforced (soft conditionalities). Examples include programs       
that combine one or more conditions, such as ensuring a minimum           
level of school attendance by children, undertaking regular visits to          
health facilities, or attending skills training programs. (WORLD        
BANK, 2015) 
 
As mentioned above, by stipulating behavioral requirements in cash transfer programs,           
it supposedly promotes compliance with health and educations recommendations,         
incentivizing patterns of behavior that are beneficial to their physical and mental health, such              
as visiting a doctor regularly and ensuring that their children go to school, it increases the                
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overall well-being of the targeted population. On another note, the CBIs define their             
preconditions according to the living conditions of each territory - since most of the people               
they help are refugees and asylum seekers living under extremely vulnerable circumstances. 
The CBI’s basic criteria of selection is based on the economical and political             
structures of the host country and not necessarily the financial capacity of each family - the                
family income is a data used more in vulnerability assessments to determine the amount of               
cash to be transferred. As for the eligibility conditions of the host government, to become a                
receiver of UNHCR aid, the country must have:  
 
a monetised economy, reactive markets able to respond to an increase           
in demand without causing inflation, beneficiary acceptance and        
‘literacy’ of the aid modality, security and adequate protection,         
availability of sufficient and safe delivery options and Timeliness and          
feasibility, e.g. from a skills and capacity perspective (UNHCR, 2012,          
p. 8) 
 
It should be highlighted that there are certain technical considerations that are factored into              
this decision, the local market conditions are an exceptionally important data since            
“Cash-based interventions are not feasible in all contexts, e.g. if the risk of inflation is too                
high or appropriate and safe transfer mechanisms are not available” (UNHCR, 2012, p.8). 
On the contrary, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is an example of Conditional Cash Transfer             
Program with “explicit conditions, monitored with minimal enforcements ” (BAIRD et al,           7
2013 apud WORLD BANK, 2015). The requirements to participate in the Bolsa Família             
program are determined by the applicant's family monthly income: they must have a monthly              
revenue of less than R$89.00 per person to be considered extremely poor, or have a monthly                
family income from R$89.00 to R$178,00 per person and have children or adolescents             
between the ages of 0 and 17 years old, or have a pregnant women or nursing woman in the                   
family (CAIXA ECONOMICA FEDERAL). Once a person applies - and is accepted in the              
program - they must give up any other benefit from other federal cash transfer programs.               
(Brazil, 2004, paragraph 7, article 2). 
The text that creates the Bolsa Família also specifies that the payment of the benefits               
will be made preferably to the woman head of the family (BRAZIL, 2004, paragraph 14 of                
article 2), this decision is also accompanied by its own criteria of conditionalities. The              
7Another program characterized with the same level of conditions and monitoring was the Mexican 
program PROSPERA (WORLD BANK, 2015) 
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continuity of the grant will depend on the appropriate fulfillment of the conditions related to               
prenatal examination, nutritional monitoring, health monitoring, school attendance of 85% for           
children until the ages of 15 years and 75% of school attendance for ages 16 and 17                 
(BRAZIL, 2004, article 3). 
The compliance with the stipulated obligations is supervised and evaluated by an Inter             
Ministerial Management Council of the Bolsa Família Program, an immediate advisory body            
to the President of the Republic. This Management Council is responsible for formulating and              
integrating public policies, defining guidelines, rules and procedures on the development and            
implementation of the Bolsa Família Program as well as supporting social public initiatives             
aimed at promoting the emancipation of families benefited by the Program (Brazil, 2004,             
article 4). The same Council is also responsible for budgetary monitoring and financial             
management, for promoting inter spherical dialogue, as well as for articulating the PBF and              
the social public policies initiated by the federal government, states, the Federal District and              
municipalities. (BRAZIL, 2004, article 5).  
 
4. Risks and Outcomes 
 
This chapter seeks to analyze the influence of each program on the overall quality of               
life of the beneficiaries, not by comparing indicators - since this research approaches the CBI               
as a type of UNHCR program, not focusing on a simple case - but by contrasting general                 
categories that both the CBI and Bolsa Família cover, such as access to food and health. This                 
section will also cover some of the risks and vulnerabilities identified in each program and               
how the implementation has coped with them.  
 
4.1 Indirect Impacts 
 
Comparing the two programs collaborates to further understanding of the social and            
economic science behind cash transfer mechanisms, and how it can produce lasting positive             
changes in vulnerable communities. Cash transfer programs have a specific quality of having             
a domino economic effect: once you distribute money - and not goods, such as food -                
beneficiaries are encouraged to buy from local markets, generating as a result, a positive              
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impacts on the regional economy of the community (CENTER FOR GLOBAL           
DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p. 8), “making limited humanitarian resources go further” (​idem​). 
There are also researches that sustain that the Cash Transfer Programs have a direct              
impact on reducing criminal behaviour, “the ability to buy certain goods with the money              
given by transfer program from the government may reduce the incentive or “need” to engage               
in economically motivated crimes” (CHIODA ​et al​, 2012). 
The greater use of humanitarian cash transfers - where appropriate - would:  
 
a. align the humanitarian system better with what people need, rather           
than what humanitarian organisations are mandated and equipped to         
provide; b. increase the transparency of humanitarian aid, including         
by showing how much aid actually reaches the target population; c.           
increase accountability of humanitarian aid, both to affected        
populations and to the tax-paying public in donor countries; d. reduce           
the costs of delivering humanitarian aid and so make limited budgets           
go further; e. support local markets, jobs and incomes of local           
producers; f. increase support for humanitarian aid from local         
populations; g. increase the speed and flexibility of humanitarian         
response; h. increase financial inclusion by linking people with         
payment systems; and i. most importantly, provide affected        
populations with choice and more control over their own lives.          
(CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p. 8). 
 
Both programs seem to benefit from the strategy to implement electronic payments.            
According to the Center for Development (2015, p. 8), it usually costs less to get cash                
transfers to people than in-kind assistance because aid agencies do not need to transport and               
store relief goods. In addition, “a four-country study comparing cash transfers and food aid              
found that 18% more people could be assisted at no extra cost if everyone received cash                
instead of food.” (​idem​) In this sense, in transferring money instead of in-kind donations, not               
only guarantees the best usage of the budget, but it helps keep track of the expenditures of the                  
programs. 
 
4.2 Vulnerabilities  
 
When compared to the stakeholders of the Brazilian program, UNHCR has a bigger             
support web which includes different, active, and qualified actors -from NGOs to other UN              
agencies- and yet, they still face many challenges when operating in new territories. The “lack               
of understanding of local contexts” (COPPENS ​et al​, 2016) can become one of the biggest               
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problems, making it difficult for field officers to operationalize an impartial strategy, and             
build a solid understanding of the existing local dynamics that can collaborate with the              
objectives of the UNHCR. 
For beneficiaries of the UNHCR’s CBI program, despite showing significant          
improvements in their physical and mental health, the amount donated is shown to be              
insufficient to meet all the needs of the population (GIORDANO ​et al​, 2017, p. 42). The                
figure below exemplifies a monitoring study of the 2016 Cash-Based Intervention issued in             
Jordan, identifying the deficit areas, where certain needs were not met.  
 
Figure 2 - Illustrates the percentage of unmet needs in Syrian respondents in the CBI in                
Jordan (2016) 
Source: GIORDANO ​et al​, 2017, p. 42​, apud​ UNHCR Cash Assistance: Improving Refugee 
Lives and Supporting Local Economies, 2016. 
 
As part of the implementation phase of Cash-Based Intervention, studies and reports            
such as the “Improving Refugee Lives and Supporting Local Economies” of 2016 seek to              
carry out a multisectoral analysis to understand what are the meet and unmet needs of the                
aided communities. From the table above, it is possible to conclude that only 16% percent of                
the respondents felt that cash transfers addressed all the indicators of needs: rent, education,              
children specific costs, health, food, household and clothes/shoes. While the rest of the 84%              
of beneficiaries felt that these basic needs that remain unmet, this finding “underlines that an               
upward expenditure trend does not equate to fulfilment of all key needs, even the ones               
associated to the most basic ones.” (GIORDANO, 2017, p. 42). 
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Considering the UNHCR’s capacity to establish public-private partnerships (UNHCR,         
2012, p. 10), a common cost-effective and safe way of delivering the benefit is the use of                 
“electronic payment systems such as prepaid debit cards, smart cards, mobile money transfer             
systems and electronic vouchers” (UNHCR, 2012, p. 10). Nevertheless, since most electronic            
transfers often “require formal identification, residence permits or network connectivity which           
limits their usefulness in certain displacement contexts”(UNHCR, 2012, p. 10), this hinders            
the inclusion of refugee and asylum-seekers who are without a legal status in the host country.                
Even though new technologies contribute to cost-effective transactions, a response solution           
was put into place to solve this issue: UNHCR made available traditional distribution methods              
such as: “Direct cash payment, Paper voucher, Mobile money and Mobile voucher” (UNHCR,             
2012, p. 10). 
Just as access to network connectivity is a concern, there is also the question whether               
the host country has enough economic stability to guarantee that the beneficiaries will have              
access to functioning markets. To do this reassessment, it is necessary that first the UNHCR is                
successful in developing a thorough understanding of the prevailing market conditions. In the             
same manner, another local vulnerability is the risk of inflation becoming too high (UNHCR,              
2012, p. 8), bringing losses to the beneficiary’s purchasing power. In this case, if the local                
market is very fragile or supply is not restocked, giving money instead of food may not be the                  
best option (CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p. 8). This can also be an alternative in               
cases when the assistance is introduced at the wrong time - such as in the peak of a lean                   
season - probably provoking a negative impact for the host communities and other             
surrounding populations in the form of increased prices and reduced supplies. (UNHCR,            
2012, p. 8). 
On the other hand, in the Bolsa Família Program, there is a concern that once the                
children in the family reach the age of 15 and are no longer eligible to become a beneficiary,                  
and if the family is not prepared to lose part of the quota of the family benefit, this can cause                    
them to become unrelieved and financially destabilized. With this in mind, beneficiaries aged             
14 and over may have access to free professional education and qualification programs and              
courses. (Brazil, 2004, paragraph 17, article 2). 
Understanding the productive impacts of cash transfers is important         
from a policy perspective, as governments often voice concerns about          
“dependency” when considering cash transfers. First, there is a         
concern that providing cash to the poor leads them to work less and to              
rely on the transfers. [...] Second, there is interest regarding whether           
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over the medium term a cash transfer program could induce          
households or individuals to transition out of poverty and to          
“graduate” from a program (DAIDONE ​et al​, 2019, p. 1402) 
 
Taking into consideration that one of the main objectives of the Bolsa Familia             
Program is to guarantee that the poor and extremely poor families have access to basic needs -                 
such as food and shelter -, the program has prioritized mechanisms that guarantee this aid,               
presenting relevant results in: 
reducing malnutrition and food and nutrition insecurity, overcoming        
discontinued and partial actions, such as distribution of basic food          
baskets, or a program integrated to the effort to build a food and             
nutrition security policy, providing improved improvements in       
segments most vulnerable to food. The increase in household food          
expenditure beneficiaries bettered their situation of food insecurity.        
Among the most relevant impacts, there is the reduction in the           
prevalence of low weight birth, one of the main factors associated           
with infant mortality. (IPEA, 2013, p. 18) 
 
Despite the positive outcomes in bettering the quality of life of the population, there is               
commonly a concern on program's influence on family autonomy. Considering that the            
program does not stipulate conditionalities in relation to the use of money, initially it is not                
possible to estimate what were the positive consequences caused by the applied            
conditionalities - holding medical appointments and guaranteeing a minimum school          
attendance rate. And regarding the quality of life of the benefited families, academic studies              
also show that there is a correlation between the PBF and the increase in beneficiaries               
associated with the formal labor market and their income (CORREA JUNIOR, TREVISAN,            
MELLO, 2019). Not only does PBF seem to promote an increase in formal revenue, but               
transfer of incomes with conditionalities have proven to act as “an element that generates              
social benefits, characterized in combating absolute poverty, improving education, health and           
combating hunger in families” (​idem​).  
Another point that is not necessarily a vulnerability, but is worth mentioning, is the              
fact that the Bolsa Família Program emerged by Federal initiative, and even though its              
existence is guaranteed by law, as any other legislation, it can be amended or revoked.               
According to the originating decree: “The amount ​​of the benefits and the reference values ​​to               
characterize situations of poverty or extreme poverty may be increased by the Executive             
Power, justified by the socioeconomic dynamics of the country and technical studies on the              
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topic ” (BRAZIL 2004, sole paragraph of article 6). In this sense, the budget of Bolsa Familia                 
and the eligibility criteria are not set in stone, they can be altered and affect the parcel of the                   
population that depend on this benefit to meet their basic needs.  
It is worth mentioning that, like any other program, the effectiveness of Bolsa Familia              
depends not only on the decision-making structure and conditionalities, but also on the             
political will to put in place certain measure necessaries for the program to function, such as:                
direct resources to the annual budget, analyse and approve individual candidatures, and update             
the benefit accordingly to the inflation rate. An example of how the political climate affects               
Bolsa Familia, is how since the beginning of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential mandate, “the line              
of Brazilians waiting for Bolsa Família reached 3.5 million people, which represents 1.5             
million low-income families. The bottleneck has caused a collapse in the social assistance             
network of municipalities” (FERNANDES, VALFRÉ, 2020). According to the journalists,          
“the reduction [of beneficiaries of the program] may have been a maneuver to guarantee the               
necessary cash to pay the 13º benefit ”(​idem​). Overall, it is possible to conclude that the               8
importance attributed to Bolsa Familia depends on the current government's interest in public             




Taking into consideration the arguments and information exposed above, one can           
conclude that Cash Transfer Programs are a better alternative to traditional assistencialism -             
where food and clothes are donated - because it gives a chance for people to buy what they                  
need, rather than what the State, or the NGO are equipped to provide (CENTER FOR               
DEVELOPMENT, 2015, p. 8). Giving the beneficiaries - refugees or the Brazilian population             
- the opportunity to meet the needs that they judge essential to their well-being, is dignifying                
and contributes to their welfare. 
Even though the inflationary effects of cash transfer - caused by an increase in money               
supply without an increase in product availability - can be a key question (HARVEY, 2005, p.                
12), it seems that both the beneficiaries and local markets respond well to cash injections               
(DENES, KOMATSU, MENEZES-FILHO, 2016). Overall, in both cases, not only does the            
method of transferring the money electronically is an affordable, secure, and transparent form             
8 In Brazil, all formal employees and beneficiaries of national income assistance programs are entitled 
to an additional payment in the end of the year called (13º benefit). 
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of money distribution, but the expenditure of the allocated money has suggested a positive              
impact on local communities’ economies. 
The UNHCR’s successful implementation of a coordinated cash transfers system in a            
host country stands as an opportunity for broader reform of the humanitarian system,             
maximizing the impact of aid providers by working actively with local pre-existing systems,             
taking advantage of their convergencies, maximizing the overall impact on the local            
community. Despite having successful cases in the face of difficult scenarios, there is a              
concern that the humanitarian system will not increase the use of cash transfers as much as it                 
should, or take advantage of the acquired experience of success cases and expand the              
implementation in more areas. 
Thus, after analyzing the main points that make up the CBI and the Bolsa Família               
Program, understanding their objectives and scopes, their forms of financing and           
implementation, as well as their risks and results, especially with regards to the behavioral              
changes arising from these initiatives, it is worth identifying whether these points are relevant              
to determine the achieved results identified in the course of this research. 
Whilst in Bolsa Família the only two eligibility criteria are the income per capita and               
the family composition, for the CBIs there are many technical considerations that are factored              
into such a decision. This difference in the selection criteria is mainly because the UNHCR               
seeks to bring aid to vulnerable persons in countries that are - almost always - politically or                 
economically unstable. Without a minimally sustained market, one cannot calculate the cost            
of a livelihood and estimate how much would it cost to finance basic needs such as shelter and                  
food. Nevertheless, most CBI cases work with the help of an active participation from the host                
government in lending existing mechanisms and public policies that can work in parallel with              
the UNHCR.  
In view of the convergent and divergent points made explicit throughout this work,             
and in light of the hypothesis that the convergences between the two programs would bring               
beneficial results in similar areas, and on the other hand, the divergences would be              
responsible for justifying major discrepancies between both programs, mainly in performance           
and indicators, it is noticed that in fact this hypothesis is hinted, but not completely proven.                
The descriptions expressed here of both cash transfer programs shed light on the hypothesis              
built, however, it comes up against a lack of depth and methodology of what is in fact                 
necessary to carry out a wide analysis of results and structural changes verified from the               
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implementation of these programs. 
Therefore, it is considered that the proposed hypothesis was partially fulfilled.           
Although it was possible to perceive that there are converging points between the two              
programs, since they address similar areas - education, health, among others, it was not              
possible to confirm that they have achieved similar results simply by a comparative analysis              
of projects scopes, methodologies and applied tools. In order to build this analysis with              
greater certainty, credibility and replicability, it would be necessary to conduct a thorough             
case study on each of the individual actions of the UNHCR, then analysing the level of                
development and the situation of each areas of society, before and after the implementation of               
the CBI. The same would be necessary for the Bolsa Família program, to which the analysis                
would be facilitated, more coherent and free of variations, since the program operates             
exclusively in Brazil. 
Going further, regarding the divergences between the two programs under analysis,           
the hypothesis is also somewhat confirmed. CBI and Bolsa Família, by nature, have a distinct               
populational focus. UNHCR's work with CBI is intrinsically international and fully focused            
on helping refugees - that suffer from a vulnerability greater than just lack of financial               
stability. Simply by such nature, any CBI action requires different care and indicators, as it is                
an interference in different countries, without necessarily an internal legal support - as occurs              
in the Bolsa Família Program. 
When it comes to financing, one of the major discrepancies between both programs             
are the economic structures that must be taken into consideration to develop the mechanism              
that are put into practice. The CBI, to effectively aid refugee and stateless communities -               
avoiding causing any additional harm -, they have to do an analysis of the host countries                
economy - to understand if the community sustains the injection of money, and if it has local                 
markets than can supply basic items - as well as a vulnerability assessment of the vulnerable                
population to understand what are their unmet needs and how much would it cost to meet                
them. These two levels of conjunctures are fundamental to understand the viability of the              
intervention and issue an implementation plan with the greatest chance of being successful -              
by diminish as much as possible, the discomfort and insecurity of refugees and stateless.  
The Bolsa Família Program, in being a domestic permanent program, is able to make              
use of interdisciplinary mechanisms, having more mechanisms to insure that the objectives            
develop as they should, causing a bigger long-term impact on the number of poor and               
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extremely poor population and their quality of life. Therefore, Bolsa Família's prerequisites            
are built in such way that the federal initiative is in sync with the recommendations and                
agenda of the Ministry of Health and Education. In the sense that, by unifying a channel of                 
aid, you are able to concentrate social data and initiatives in a single public policy. 
These divergences between the two programs demonstrate how necessary it is to            
design different indicators to assess the influence of each of the two programs - especially               
considering that the objective of PBF is to reduce poverty and CBIs seek to guarantee basic                
livelihood of refugees and stateless people during their stay in a host country. Because the               
field of action of the two programs is completely distinct from each other, the implementation               
of Bolsa Família, as a government action requires a different level of criteria and planning               
than the implementation of an assistance program, such as CBI, which operates at the              
international level and is coordinated by a political and decentralized international           
organization, dependent on donations from other states, and that is also part of a complex               
international regime while also dealing with the host country’s own challenging domestic            
politics. 
In short, the divergences in scope, methodology, tools, objectives, implementation and           
even financing between the UNHCR’s CBI and the Bolsa Família Program are in fact an               
important and essential factor to easily identifying the need to establish different indicators             
and criteria for the full functioning of each of these programs within their reality. The same                
relation, however, is not possible when accessing the convergences between the two            
programs, with regards to the multi-sector activity and, consequently, the results obtained in             
them. 
Finally, it can be stated that it is not possible to draw a causal line between similarity                 
of performance in terms of promoting education, health, well-being, quality of life, and the              
relevant positive results in these areas, in each of the communities and families affected by               
such cash transfer actions. To confirm this hypothesis, a more in-depth analysis is needed, on               
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